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ABSTRACT
We  use   data   from   a   sample of day care centers to estimate the relationships   between   cost   and   the
quality   of   the   child   care   service   provided,   and   between   revenue   and   quality.   We  use   a   measure   of   child   care
quality derived from an instrument designed by developmental psychologists. This measure of quality has
been found to be positively associated with child development. Taking the estimated cost-quality and
revenue-quality relationships as given, we then estimate   the   objective   functions of the firms and compute
the supply function for quality. The results indicate that (1) the   estimated cost function is inconsistent with
the   implications   of   cost-minimization;   (2)   for-profit   firms operate at a positive level of marginal cost,   but
non-profit   firms   operate   at zero or negative marginal cost; (3) revenue is positively but weakly   associated
with   quality;   and   (4)   the   supply   of   quality   is inelastic, with point estimates of the   supply   elasticity   of   .04-.05
for both for-profit and non-profit firms. Implications of the results for child care policy are discussed.
David M. Blau  H. Naci Mocan
Department of Economics University of Colorado at Denver
Gardner Hall  Department of Economics
University of North Carolina Campus Box 181, PO box 173364
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nmocan@carbon.cudenver.edu1 Day care centers accounted for 30 percent of all primary child care arrangements for
preschool children of employed mothers in 1993 (Casper, 1997).  In-home babysitters and family day
care providers constituted 21 percent of arrangements, but there is much less information available
about such providers. Relatives, including the father and the mother (while working) accounted for the
remaining child care for preschool children of employed mothers.
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1. Introduction
Developmental  psychologists assert that the cognitive, social, and emotional
development  of children is enhanced by exposure to high-quality child care and is harmed
by exposure to low-quality care (Hayes, Palmer, and  Zaslow, 1990). The quality of child
care services in  the U.S. is thought to be mediocre on average, particularly in comparison
to  the quality of care provided in other developed countries (Whitebook, Howes and
Phillips,  1990; Mocan, 1997; Bergman, 1996). There is considerable interest among policy
makers  in finding ways to increase the quality of child care in the U.S. For example, the
Federal  Child Care Development Block Grant stipulated that a portion of funds
appropriated  under the grant be set aside for “quality-improving” activities.  However,
using government policy instruments to accomplish this goal will be difficult without
understanding the behavior of firms supplying day care services, the “technology”  of day
care,  and the resulting relationships among quality, cost, and the price of care.
1 Until
recently, little was known about these important issues  in the child care market.  Mocan
( 1995, 1997) provided the first analysis of the cost-quality relationship for day care centers
with  results that are useful for public policy, including an estimate of the cost of increasing
quality.  We build on Mocan’s analysis by extending his approach to estimating the cost
function  for day care centers, and by estimating the supply function for quality. Our results
provide a basis for analyzing the impact of alternative forms of government subsidies and
regulations intended to improve child care quality.
An important issue in conducting such an analysis is the  appropriate definition
of  child care quality. Several previous analyses of the cost-quality relationship in day care
centers  included variables such as the child-staff ratio, group size, and the average
education of the staff as proxies for quality in the cost function (Preston, 1993; Mukerjee
and  Witte, 1993; Powell and Cosgrove, 1992). However, these variables are more
appropriately thought of as inputs to the production of quality, and as such do not belong2 Another problem with treating these variables as proxies for quality is that they do not
appear to be closely related to either the quality of care or child development (Blau, 1997; in press).
This is similar to the common finding in the literature on schools that observable resources have little
measurable impact on student outcomes (Hanushek, 1994). See Gertler and Waldman (1992) for an
analysis of the cost function for nursing homes that treats quality as an unobserved choice variable of the
firm.
3 Other common arguments for intervention in the child care market are that parents are
unaware of the benefits of high-quality care or lack the ability to discern the quality of care.
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in the cost function.
2 In other contexts, the quality of child care purchased by a family has
be en treated as exogenous (Ribar, 1995), as equivalent to the family’s expenditure on child
care  (Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel, 1992), as an unobserved variable  proxied by
the  mode of care (day care center, family day care home, etc.; Leibowitz, Waite, and
Witsberger,  1988), or as an unobserved choice variable (Blau and Robins, 1988; Connelly,
1992).   In this paper we take a different approach. Developmental psychologists define the
quality  of child care by the developmental appropriateness of the interactions between the
provider  and the child, and the environment, curriculum, materials, and activities to which
children are exposed.  Psychologists have designed instruments to measure the quality of
child  care defined in this way. For example, teaching staff can be rated by observers on
aspects  of care such as how sensitive they are to children, whether they encourage children
to  engage in activities, and use positive guidance techniques. As measured by these
instru ments, child care quality has a positive effect on child development. This is not
surprising,  because child care quality is  defined by provider behavior and environments that
have  been determined through research and practice to foster child development (Love,
Schochet, and Meckstroth, 1996).
We believe  that the concept of child care quality developed by psychologists is
the appropriate one for our purposes. Arguments for government intervention in the child
care  market are often based on the externalities generated by exposing children to high
qualit y care (Council of Economic Advisors, 1997; Robins, 1991; Hayes, Palmer, and
Zaslow,  1990).
3  It makes sense, therefore, to use a measure of quality that is known to be
correlated with child development when analyzing the supply of quality in child care.  
We use a measure of  child care quality derived from an instrument designed by
developmental  psychologists. This instrument was used to rate the quality of care provided
in  a stratified random sample of 400 day care centers in four states.  Detailed data on costs,4 We improve upon previous analyses of day care center cost functions in several ways. 
First, we allow for the possibility that input prices and the quantity and quality of services are
endogenous in the cost function as a result of unobserved heterogeneity across centers.  Second, we
account for the fact that care is provided in groups and that the number of groups is a discrete choice
variable of the center. Third, we explicitly account for corner solutions for inputs. Fourth, we specify a
cost function that does not hold the quantity of capital fixed, which allows us to determine the long run
response of centers to changes in input prices.
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inputs, prices, and other key variables were  collected for the same centers.  We use these
data  to estimate the cost function
4 and the market price-quality locus facing day care
centers. These two functions are the constraints faced  by day care centers in their efforts
to achieve their objectives. Taking these estimated constraints as given, we then estimate
the objective functions of the firms in our sample. We assume that firms care about profit
and  quality, and we estimate the relative weights attached to these two variables, using
variation across firms  in the constraint functions they face to identify these weights. This
variation  arises from variation in geographical location of the firms, both across and within
states,  and from variation in the estimated technology across for-profit and non-profit firms.
We allow for-profit and non-profit firms to have different relative weights on profit and
quality,  and we specify and estimate additional constraints on the profit that can be earned
by  non-profit centers as a result of their non-profit legal status. We use the estimated
constraint  and objective functions to simulate the supply of quality and the response of
firms to subsidies and regulations intended to increase the quality of child care.
The  main findings are that (1) the estimated cost function is inconsistent with the
implications  of cost-minimization; (2) for-profit firms operate at a positive level of marginal
cost,  but non-profit firms operate at zero or negative marginal cost; (3) revenue is positively
but  weakly associated with quality in most cases; and (4) the supply of quality is inelastic,
with  point estimates of the supply elasticity of .04-.05 for both for-profit and non-profit
firms. 
In  the following sections of the paper we specify a model of day care center
behavior,  describe our econometric methods, discuss the data, and present the results. The
final section concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results.5 Infants and toddlers include children ages 0-29 months, preschoolers 30-59 months, and
kindergarten-school ages 60+ months.
6 We observe quality in at most two rooms per center. We observe the configuration of all
rooms in the center, but without observations on the quality of each room we cannot account for
variation in room configuration within room types.
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2.  A Model of Day Care Center Behavior
A. Technology and Cost
We classify the care provided in day care centers according to the ages of children
served,  because the “technology” of day care is likely to differ across age groups. There are
three  age groups in a day care center: (1) infant-toddler, (2) preschool, and (3)
kindergarten-school  age.
5 There are T types of teaching staff categorized by skill, as
measure d by education and training. The production function for quality in a room of type
(age group) i in center j is 
Qij  = Q
i (N ij1 ,...,N ijT , H ij , g ij , R j , M ij , µ j ,  >ij ,  ,Qij )  (1)
where   Qij   is  the quality of care provided in a room of type i (i=1, 2, 3) in center j, N ijk  is the
weekly number of staff-hours of type k employed in the room, H ij  is the number  of hours
per  week spent by children in the room, g ij  is the number of children cared for in the room
(group  size), R j  is a vector of center characteristics taken as given by the firm (e.g., whether
the firm is for-profit or non-profit), M ij  is a vector of  room-type-specific child and family
characteristics , µ j  is a center-specific error component,   >ij  is a room-type-and-center-
specific error component, and  ,Qij  is  an idiosyncratic room-center error.  The values of µ j ,
>ij ,  and  ,Qij  are assumed to be known to the firm when input decisions are made. Group size
g ij  = K ij /G ij , where K ij  is the  number of children of type i enrolled in center j, and G ij  is the
number of groups (rooms) for children of age group i in center j.
All  rooms of a given type in a center are assumed to have the same configuration
(group  size and number of staff by type), but configurations can differ across the three types
of  rooms. We ignore the fact that there actually is variation in configuration of rooms within
room types, because we have no way to account for such variation in the empirical
analysis.
6 The hourly cost of employing a worker of skill level k, denoted W jk ,  is the same
across rooms, and is taken as given by the firm. The quality production function depicted
by  (1) may have different parameters for the three types of rooms. Restricting the7 In the empirical analysis we allow for the possibility that H, K, Q, and W are endogenous as
a result of unobserved heterogeneity. Another set of constraints that a firm might face in minimizing cost
is state regulations governing the maximum allowable group size, the minimum allowable staff-child
ratio, and the qualifications of the staff. It is straightforward to incorporate such regulations in the
model, but we do not do so here because regulations do not appear to be binding constraints on most of
the firms in our sample. We discuss this below.
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technology  to be the same across room types yields a more parsimonious model, and is
testable.
Both  for-profit and non-profit firms are assumed to be cost minimizers. The firm
chooses  the weekly number of hours of each type of staff (the N’s) and the number of
groups  to which the K ij  children will be assigned (G ij ,  or equivalently, group size g ij )  to
minimize cost subject to the production constraint, given values of H ij , K ij , R j , M ij ,  µ j ,   >ij ,
,Qij ,  and a given level of quality for each room-type.  We treat the quantity of output (child-
hours of care and numbers of children: H and K) and the family and child characteristics
(M) as determined by choices made by  consumers, given the price and quality set by the
firm.
7  The firm’s problem is to
                        3     T          3
Min  ￿   =  3 [ 3Nijk W jk Gij  + f(K ij )] +  3Gij 8ij [Q ij  - Q
i (N ij1 ,...,N ijT , H ij , g ij , R j , M ij , µ j ,  >ij ,  ,Qij ) ]       (2)
Nijk , G ij          i=1 k=1           i=1
where f(K ij ) is non-personnel cost. The first term of (2) is the  total cost of providing care
for  the K j  = K 1j  + K 2j  + K 3j  children who enroll at the center. This consists of the cost of
staffing  G ij  groups of type i with N ijk  staff hours of type k, k=1,...T, i = 1, 2, 3; and the
associated non-personnel  cost, f(K ij ).  The second term is the set of production constraints
for  the G ij  rooms of type i in center j, i = 1, 2, 3. We treat non-personnel cost as a
deterministic  function of the number of children served for practical reasons: we have little
information on input prices other than staff compensation.
Because G ij  is an integer, the problem is solved in two stages: first, choose the
optimal  values of N ijk  for a given value of G ij ; then choose the optimal value of G ij .  The
first-order condition for N ijk  for a given value of G ij  is
        W jk Gij  =  8ij [ MQ
i ( C)/ MNijk ]   if N ijk  > 0   if at the optimum,  k=1,...,T; i=1,2,3.     (3)
The first-order  conditions for the full interior solution for rooms of type i (in which N ijk  >
0  for all of the T teacher types) can be solved jointly with the production function for
conditional input demand functions for the N’s and the cost function for room-type i:8 An alternative approach is to parameterize the production function and solve explicitly for
the cost-minimizing input demands and cost function. In this case the same underlying set of production
parameters would enter the input demands and cost function for every combination of corner solutions.
The restrictions would automatically be satisfied for every   combination of corner solutions since the
input demands and cost function would be derived under the  assumption of cost-minimization.
Unfortunately, this is much too complex to be feasible with many staff types.
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Cij  = C
i (W j1 ,..., W jT , H ij , Q ij , R j , M ij , G ij , K ij , µ j ,  >ij ) (4)
Nijk  = N
ik (W j1 ,..., W jT , H ij , Q ij , R j , M ij , G ij , K ij , µ j ,  >ij ) (5)
These functions have standard  properties: the cost function is homogenous of degree one
in the W’s;   the input demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in the W’s and
satisfy symmetry conditions; and the input demand functions are the first partial derivatives
of  the cost function with respect to input prices. We test the estimated cost and input
demand functions for these properties.
A firm may choose a corner solution in which it does not use staff of some type
k  in rooms of type i. Functions similar to (4) and (5) can be derived for all possible
combinations of corner solutions for the N ijk . Imposing and testing  the conditions for such
functions  to be consistent with cost-minimizing behavior would have to be done separately
for every  combination of corner solutions, which means estimating a separate set of cost
and input demand functions for all of the observed combinations of  corner solutions. If T
is even moderately large then the number of parameters would be far too large, and there
are insufficient numbers of cases in the data with any given corner solution.
8
Instead, we  estimate the cost function and input demands corresponding to the
full interior solution, imposing and testing the  restrictions implied by cost-minimization,
and  include in the analysis all firms whether or not they chose the full interior solution. We
do,  however, account for self-selection of firms by whether they use particular types of
staff. We specify functions that determine whether each individual staff type is used:
  Dijk =1 iff   D
ik (W j1 ,..., W jT , H ij , Q ij , R j , M ij , G ij , K ij , µ j ,  >ij ,  ,Dijk ) > 0   k=1,...,T (6)
where  D ijk =1  if staff of type k are used in rooms of type i, and D ijk =0 otherwise. These
functions  are approximations to the true functions determining whether it is optimal to use
any  type-k staff. One approach to parameterizing these functions is to assume that they
contain  the same parameters as the N ijk  demand functions in (5): this would be a tobit-like
specification.  Alternatively, they can be freely parameterized, estimated as probits, and the9  This approximation approach to the corner solution problem requires that firms that do not
use a given staff type in a particular type of room nevertheless must be included in the cost function with
values for all of the W’s.  Firms that do not use a particular type of staff are assigned the average
compensation of other firms in their state that employ the staff type.
10   Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) use output instead of quality. Quality seems the more
natural variable to use here. See Hansmann (1996), Weisbrod (1998), and Rose-Ackerman (1996) for
discussion of the analysis of the behavior of non-profit firms.  
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“tobit” restrictions can be tested.
9
The  above analysis is repeated for each feasible value of G ij ,  and the solution
cor responding to the value of G ij  that yields the lowest total cost is optimal. Hence the






ij , ...) <  C
i (..., G Nij , ...)   ￿ G Nij   ￿ G
*
ij ,        (7)
This is a structural equation for G and contains the same parameters as the cost function.
An  alternative approach that we pursue in the empirical analysis is to specify a non-
structural  ordered model for G that includes the same arguments as in (4) and (5), but
without restricting the parameters to be the  same as those in (4). This model is specified
below.
B. Price Determination
Following the literature on demand for differentiated products (Rosen 1974), and
its  application to child care (Blau and Hagy, 1998; Hagy, 1998; Walker, 1992), we assume
that there exists an equilibrium price-quality locus in firm  j’s market:
P j  = P(Q j , X m(j) ), (8)
where  Q j  is the firm’s average level of quality, and X m(j)  represents factors that shift the
locus,  such as the size and characteristics of the market  m(j) in which firm j is located.  By
choosing the level of quality to provide, a firm determines the price it will be able to charge
per  hour of care, P j . By choosing a day care center, parents determine the price they pay per
hour  of care.  Firms and consumers are assumed to take P(Q j ,  X m(j ) )  as given: it is
determined  by market supply and demand, not by the actions of any individual firm or
consumer.
C.  Quality Supply
We follow Lakdawalla and Philipson  (1998), and assume an objective function
of the form U(Q j ,   B(Q j )),  where  B represents the firm’s profit.
10   If U Q  ￿ 0 the  firm is said11 Some second-order terms have been omitted in order to avoid an overly parameterized
model.
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to  have “profit-deviating” preferences. A center with for-profit legal status could have
pr ofit-deviating preferences or could be a profit-maximizer (U Q = 0).  The same is true for
a  center with non-profit status.  A for-profit center chooses Q to maximize U(Q,  B(Q))
subject  only to the  B(Q)  constraint, while a non-profit center chooses Q to maximize  U(Q,
B(Q))  subject to  B =  B(Q)  and  Bl #  B#  Bu,  where  Bl  is the minimum level of profit needed
to  survive in the long run (which could be negative), and  Bu is the legal upper limit on the
profit  that can be earned by a non-profit center. As noted above, cost-minimization is
assumed in both cases. The first-order condition (FOC) for a for-profit center is 
UQ(Q j ) + U B(Q j )(MR(Q j ) - MC(Q j )) = 0,  (9)
where  MR is marginal revenue and MC is marginal cost. If the constraint  Bl   #  B#  Bu is not
binding, then (9) also characterizes the behavior of a non-profit center. If  B  #  Bu is binding,
then the FOC is  B(Q j )  = R(Q j )  - C(Q j ) =  Bu, where R is revenue and C is cost. If  Bl   #  B is
binding, then the FOC is  B(Q j ) = R(Q j ) - C(Q j ) =  Bl .
3. Empirical Implementation
A. Cost and Input Demand Functions
We specify a translog cost function, as in many other analyses of service
industries (e.g. Mocan, 1997; Gertler and Waldman, 1992; Gagne, 1990).   Conditional on
Gij , the cost function is specified as:
lnCij  =   $0i  +  3k$ik lnW jk  +  $Gi lnGij  +  $Qi lnQij +  $Ki lnKij  +  $Hi lnHij  +  $Ri Rj  +  $Mi Mij
+  ½ 3k3m(ikm   lnW jk lnW jm  +  3k(Gik lnW jk lnGij  +  3k(Rik lnW jk Rj  +  3k(Mik lnW j kMij
+   3k(Kik lnW jk lnKij  +  3k(Hik lnW jk lnHij  +  (GQi lnGij lnQij  + ½ (Qi ( lnQij )
2 +
½(Ki ( lnKij )
2 + ½ (Hi ( lnHij )
2 + ½ (Gi ( lnGij )
2 +  (RQi Rj lnQij  +  (MQi Mij lnQij  +
(KQlnKij lnQij  + µ j  +  >ij,
11 (10)
where C ij  is total cost for rooms of type i in center j. The corresponding cost share equation,
given that an input is used, is
S ijk  =  $ik  +  3m(ikm lnW jm  +  (Gik lnGij  +  (Rik Rj  +  (Mik Mij  +  (Kik lnKij  +  (Hik lnHij  +
DµSik µ j  +   D>Sik >ij  +  ,Sijk , (11)
where S ijk  is the share of  the firm’s total cost accounted for by staff of type k in rooms of9
type  i,  DµSik  and  D>Sik  are factor loadings introduced to allow flexibility in the error
correlation  structure, and  ,Sijk  is a disturbance. The  testable restrictions implied by cost-
minimization are: 
  T          T
3$ik  = 1;         3(ikm = 0  ￿ m; (ikm  =  (imk    ￿ m  ￿ k
k=1         k=1
and that the parameters of the cost share equations are in fact the same as the
corresponding  parameters in the cost function. We assume that total cost is observed with
err or: C j  =  3i Cij  +  ,cj ,  where C j  is observed cost and  ,cj  is measurement error. Note that we
observe the center’s total cost (C j ) but not the breakdown of cost by room type (C ij ).
The  non-structural ordered model for the number of groups of type i has the form
Gij  = n  iff   6n$G
i (W j1 ,..., W jT , H ij , Q ij , R j , M ij , G ij , K ij , µ j ,  >ij ) +  ,Gij  >  6n-1 , n=1,...,G
max   (12)
where the  6’s are parameters to be estimated ( 60/- 4, and  6Gmax /4).
B. Quality, Wages, Numbers and Hours of Children, and Any Rooms of Type i
The  unobserved factors that affect cost and input demand will also affect the
production  of quality.  To account for this potential endogeneity, we specify a reduced form
equation  for the logarithm of quality. We also specify reduced form equations for the
logarithms of H, K, and W in order  to account for the possibility that these variables are
affected  by the same unobserved heterogeneity as cost, and for similar reasons we specify
a reduced form model to explain whether the center has any rooms of type i. 
LnQij  =  *01  +  *11 Mij  +  *21 Rj  +  *31 Z j  +  DµWµ j  +   D>W>ij  +  ,Qij   (13)
LnHij  =  *02  +  *12 Mij  +  *22 Rj  +  *32 Z j  +  DµQµ j  +   D>Q>ij  +  ,Hij    (14)
LnKij  =  *03  +  *13 Mij  +  *23 Rj  +  *33 Z j  +  DµKµ j  +   D>K>ij  +  ,Kij    (15)
LnW jk  =  *04  +  *14 Mij  +  *24 Rj  +  *34 Z j  +  DµHµ j  +   D>H>ij  +  ,Wjk (16)
         Pr(G ij >0) = Pr(I Gij   /  *05  +  *15 Mij  +  *25 Rj  +  *35 Z j  +  DµGµ j  +   D>G>ij  > - ,Gaij ) (17)
where Z is a  vector of identifying instruments to be specified below. By including µ j  and
>ij  we allow for the possibility that unobserved center-specific and room-specific factors
associated  with productivity also affect wages etc. Note that the parameters of these
auxiliary equations are not allowed to vary by room type or staff type. This restriction is
imposed in order to avoid an excessively large number of parameters.
C. Error Structure
Following  Mroz (1999), we assume that µ j  and  >ij  are independent random effects10
with discrete distributions:
Pr(µ j  = µ h) =  Jh, h=1,...,A;    Pr( >ij  =  >in ) =  <in , n=1,...,B,   i = 1,2,3
where   3hJh=1,   3n<in =1,  µ h and  >in  are points of support of the distributions, and  Jh and  <in
are  probability weights. The  J’s,   <’s,  µ’s and  >’s  are parameters to be estimated. A and B
are  specified a priori and the model is estimated for alternative values of A and B. This
specification allows the outcomes across rooms in a given center to be correlated, allows
outcomes within rooms to be correlated as well, conditional on  the center-specific factor,
and does not impose normality on the random effects. See Blau and Hagy (1998) and Hu
(1999)  for empirical applications of this discrete factor approach. The disturbances  ,Cj ,   ,Sijk ,
,Wjk ,   ,Qij ,   ,Kij ,   ,Hij ,   ,Dijk ,  and  ,Gaij  are assumed to be independently normally distributed with
mean  zero and standard deviations  FC,   FSk ,   FW,   FQ,   FK,   FH, 1, and 1,  respectively.  The  F’s
are restricted to be independent of room-type in order to avoid a large number of  F’s.  The
disturbance  ,Gij  is assumed to follow the extreme value distribution, yielding an ordered
logit model for G ij . The likelihood function is specified in Appendix A.
D.  Price Function
The price equation is specified as a double-log model:
LnP j  =  2Xm(j)  + TlnQ j  +  0I j  + u j , (18)
where  I j  is the proportion of infant-toddlers among center j’s children,  2,   T,  and  0 are
parameters,  and u j  is a disturbance. In the estimation we specify the market-specific factors
Xm(j)  by zipcode dummies: the intercept of the price function is allowed to vary freely across
zipcodes, which are assumed to constitute the relevant  markets. The quality parameter  T
is  restricted to be the same across zip codes within a state, but is allowed to vary across
states.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the average fee of the center.  It is a
weight ed average of infant-toddler and preschool fees, weighted by the proportion of infant-
toddlers  and preschoolers.  Thus, we include the proportion of infant-toddlers as an
explanatory  variable. This equation is estimated independently of the cost and other
functions.  It is possible to estimate it jointly with the other equations, but it contains a large
number  of parameters, making joint estimation burdensome. Experimentation with the
equation  suggested that conditional on the zipcode fixed effects unobserved heterogeneity12 We augmented the specification in eq. 18 with 15 characteristics of centers and four
characteristics of the parents of the children served by the centers. Conditional on the zipcode fixed
effects, we could not reject the hypothesis that these characteristics could be excluded from the
regression. Most of the coefficient estimates on the characteristics were insignificantly different from
zero individually as well.
11
is not a problem, so we estimate it by OLS.
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E.  Center Behavior and Quality Supply
We adopt  a Cobb-Douglas specification of the objective function:
U(Q,  B(Q)) = (Q j )
"( Bj )
1- " (19)
where  " is allowed to differ between for-profit  and non-profit firms. Profit maximization
implies  " = 0. The FOC  for a for-profit center implies
(MC(Q) - MR(Q)) =  "B/(1- ")Q +  ,p    (20)
where
Revenue = R =  3i Kij Hij P j  = exp{ 2Xm(j)  + TlnQ j  +  0I j  + u j } 3i Kij Hij
MR =   MR/ MQ =  TRj /Q j  
MC = [ MlnC/ MlnQ]C(Q)/Q 
        = [ $Qi  + (GQi lnGij  +  (Qi lnQij   +  (RQi Rj  +  (MQi Mij +  (KQlnKij  ]C j /Q j
and   ,p is measurement error in MC-MR. Equation (20) is a nonlinear implicit equation for
the optimal Q.
A non-profit center for which the constraint  Bl   #  B  #  Bu is not binding has a FOC
of the same form as (20),
(MC(Q) - MR(Q)) =  "B/(1- ")Q +  ,n    (21)
where  ,n is measurement error. A non-profit center that  would have chosen  B >  Bu in the
absence of a constraint will be forced to set Q so that  B(Q)  = R(Q) - C(Q) =  Bu.  We assume
that   Bu is known to the firm but unobserved by us. It can therefore be treated as a
disturbance. Similarly, a firm that hits the  Bl   #  B constraint will be forced to set  B =  Bl , and
we  treat  Bl  as observed by the firm but unknown to us. This results in a switching
regression  model with unknown regime. We do not know whether any particular non-profit
center is in the unconstrained regime ( Bl  <  B <   Bu)  or one of the constrained regimes  ( B
=   Bu or  B =  Bl ).  The model governing the choice of Q in the unconstrained regime is
equation  (21), and in the constrained regimes is R(Q) - C(Q) =  Bu or R(Q) - C(Q) =  Bl ,
which are implicit equations for Q. Suppose that  ,n ~ N(0,  Fn
2),  Bu ~  N( Ru,   Fu
2),  and  Bl  ~13 Alternatively, (20) could be estimated by nonlinear least squares for the for-profit sample.
We estimate the firm objective function parameters separately from the cost and price equations in order
to avoid contaminating the cost and price estimates by a misspecified objective function, since we are
least confident about the latter.
14 It is possible that some of the child and family characteristics in M ij  and some of the center
characteristics in R j  are endogenous as well. We ignore this possibility because of the very large number
of parameters that would have to be estimated if models for M ij  and R j  were added.
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N( Rl ,   Fl
2).  The probability that a center is constrained by  Bl  is  8l  = Pr( Bl > B*),  where  B* is
the unconstrained level of profit, which is the solution to (21): 
8l  = Pr( Bl > B*) = Pr( Bl  > (MC(Q*) - MR(Q*))(1- ")Q*/ ")
where Q* is the unconstrained  choice for Q, which is found by solving (21) numerically.
The probability that a center is constrained by  Bu is
8u = Pr( Bu< B*) = Pr(MC(Q*) - MR(Q*))(1- ")Q*/ " >  Bu)
Taking  the parameters of the cost and fee equations as given, the likelihood function
contribution for a non-profit child care center is
L = [ N((R[Q]  - C[Q]- Rl )/ Fl )/ Fl ]
8l [ N((R[Q] - C[Q]- Ru)/ Fu)/ Fu]
8u[ N( ,n/ Fn)/ Fn]
1- 8l- 8u
The  parameters to be estimated are  ",   Fn,   Rl ,   Ru,   Fl ,  and  Fu.  We restrict  " to the unit
interval. Testing the hypothesis  of profit-maximization involves a restriction on  " and is
straig htforward. We can incorporate for-profits and non-profits in the same analysis and
explicitly  test whether the parameters of their objective functions differ. The likelihood
contribution for a for-profit center is L= N( ,p/ Fp)/ Fp,  where  Fp is the standard deviation of
,p, and  ,p is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean.
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F. Quality Supply
With  estimates of  ",  Ru,   Rl  and the parameters of the cost and fee equations, we
solve numerically for the quality supply function, Q = Q
*( 2,  W 1,...,  W T,  K, H, R, M), which
provides  a picture of how quality supplied varies with the determinants of price and cost.
The  quality supply function for non-profits accounts for the different regimes by weighting
by the estimated values of the  8’s. The quality supply function is solved for each point  of
support in the distribution of the discrete factors, and integrated over the distributions.
G. Identification
The  cost function contains 4+T potentially endogenous regressors: the number of
groups,  quality, wages, child-hours, and child enrollment (G, Q,  H, K, W 1-W T)
14 .  Our15 The regions were Los Angeles County; the Colorado Springs, Denver, Boulder, Fort
Collins, Greeley area; the Hartford-New Haven area; and the “Triad” area of Winston-Salem,
Greensboro, and Burlington.
16 Infant-toddler rooms were defined as those where the majority of children were less than
two-and-a-half years old.  Preschool classrooms were defined as those where the majority of children
were at least two-and-a-half years old, but not yet in kindergarten. No school age or kindergarten
classrooms were observed.
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identification  strategy assumes that location within a state (state dummies are included in
the  cost function in R j ),  as defined by a center’s zip code, is uncorrelated with technology,
but  is correlated with these potentially endogenous regressors. In other words, we assume
that the location  of a center is exogenous, and that location affects cost only via its effects
on  G, Q,  H, K, and W 1-W T.  There are on average 1.6 centers per zip code in the data. One
way to operationalize this is to include zip code dummies as instruments (the Z’s) in the
equations for G, Q, H, K, and W’s. This would add a very large number of parameters to
the  model, so we follow a different approach. We estimate a set of regressions of center
characteristics  on zip code dummies and construct from each regression a linear
combination of the zip code dummies given by the regression coefficients. We use these
linear  combinations as the identifying instruments, along with the zipcode-level
unemployment rate. The model is nonlinear and  is therefore identified without exclusion
restrictions, so we are able to test the validity of our restrictions.
4. Data
We use data collected from day care centers in California, Colorado, Connecticut,
and North Carolina as part of the Cost, Quality, and Outcomes (CQO) Study.  A random
sample of 50 for-profit  and 50 non-profit day care centers providing full-time year-round
care  was selected from specified regions within each state.
15  Interviewers visited each
center  in the Spring of 1993 and gathered detailed  information on costs, revenues,
dona tions, quality, and the human capital characteristics and wages of every worker. In
addition  to information collected from interviewing the center director, two rooms at each
center  were randomly chosen to be observed: one preschool and one infant-toddler room if
the center served both age groups.
16  Trained observers visited  each center for one day to17   See Harms and Clifford (1980) and Harms, Cryer and Clifford (1990) for details. Several
other instruments were used as well, but we focus on the ECERS and ITERS as our measure of quality. 
Interrater reliability at each site and between sites was very high for all instruments used.
18 Additional descriptive information by state and profit status can be found in Mocan (1997)
and Helburn (1995).
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observe  the rooms.  They recorded the group size and the number of staff in each of the
selected  rooms five different times during the morning. The Early Childhood
Environmental  Rating Scale (ECERS) and the Infant-Toddler Environmental Rating Scale
(ITERS) were used to measure the quality of care provided in the selected rooms.   These
instruments  contain around 30 items characterizing personal care routines, furnishings,
language-reasoning  experience, fine and gross motor activities, creative activities, and
social  development. Each item is scored on a seven point scale with a score of one
representing  inadequate and a score of seven representing excellent. These are widely used
instruments,  and have good psychometric properties.
17  In essence, they formalize the
notions  of quality that a well-educated parent might look for when visiting a center: the
nature of  the interactions between staff and children; the developmental appropriateness
of  the materials, toys, playground equipment, and activities; and the hygiene and food
preparation practices of the center. Appendix B provides a list of items and examples of
instructions to the observers on how to score items. We use the average score across the
items as our measure of quality.
The descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 indicate that infant-toddler rooms
have significantly lower quality than preschool rooms, and that average quality in preschool
rooms  is 4.3, which corresponds to a description of somewhere between “minimal” and
“good.”  Table 2 shows that average quality is higher in non-profit centers; this is due
largely  to a pronounced difference between the quality of for-profit and non-profit centers
in North Carolina.
18
Cost is  the sum of annual wage and salary expenditure, nonwage benefits, staff
education costs,  subcontracting costs, food costs, other operating expenses, the estimated
value of in-kind donations (food, volunteer services, and supplies), overhead, insurance,
and  occupancy costs (rent or mortgage, utilities, repair and maintenance).  For centers that
use  donated space the annual rental value of the space is calculated and treated as19 Non-profit centers that rely heavily on donated space may face a constraint on expansion if
they already use the space to capacity. We added a measure of square feet of space to the cost function
for non-profits and found that its coefficient estimate was highly significant, but the basic implications of
the analysis were unchanged.
20 Goldhaber and Brewer (1997) show that specific teacher training in math is a better
predictor of student achievement in high school than is the teacher’s general level of education.
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occupancy cost.  For those centers that receive financial help with rent, the discount they
receive  on rent is added to occupancy costs. Since our aim is to estimate a long run cost
function in which all inputs are treated  as variable, we include all costs.
19  Annual cost is
divided by 52 to obtain a measure of weekly total cost that is used in the estimation.  The
center  director provided information on the total number of children enrolled in the center
by  age, average hours per child by age, and the number of rooms by age. As shown in Table
2,  average weekly cost per child is 14 percent higher in non-profit centers. Average cost per
unit  of quality is lower in non-profit centers, but average cost per child per unit of quality
is higher.
The  center director provided a roster of all workers in the center, including data
on the hourly wage or annual salary,  hours of work per week, years of experience, tenure
at  the center, training, age, race, gender, the age group of children served and the worker’s
job  title. After considerable experimentation, we decided to classify staff into four
categories (T=4)  by years of formal education: high school dropout, high school graduate,
some  college, and college graduate. The survey contains detailed information on the
specific  type and source of child-development-related training of each staff member. In
preliminary  analyses we found that this additional training information was for the most
part  redundant once staff were categorized by years of schooling. However, we did find that
worker  productivity differed by job title (teacher versus aide) and by job tenure (less than
one year versus one or more years) within education categories. Therefore,  we attempted
to  estimate models with more than four staff types, but the very large number of parameters
in  such models made it impossible to achieve convergence in most cases. Conditional on
education, title, and tenure, we found no differences in staff productivity by age, race, or
total years of child care experience in our preliminary analysis. We discuss below the
sensitivity  of the results to using education versus training as the basis for classifying staff
by skill.
20  Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on staff hours and cost share by staff-type21 Wages are averaged over all staff with a given level of education.The center’s total
expenditure on fringe benefits is divided by total staff hours to measure the average hourly value of
fringe benefits.
22 This group includes Head Start programs, centers where 20 percent or more of the
enrollment constitute special needs children, special preschool programs sponsored by the State or
Federal Department of Education, and other special programs in Connecticut and California.  
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and room-type.  Table 2 shows average hourly compensation by staff type. Compensation
consists  of average hourly earnings plus estimated average fringe benefits per hour.
21
Compensation  rises with education, but not by as much as in other jobs held by women
(Blau, 1992; Mocan and Viola, 1997).  Non-profit centers pay substantially higher wages
than for-profits.
Two  measures of group size are shown in Table 1. “Enrolled group size” is
derived  from a roster of all the rooms in the center that lists the number of children
enrolled  in each room and their age group. “Observed group size” is the average of five
measures  of group size recorded during the morning observation period for the two rooms
observed. Observed group size is less than enrolled group size because some children are
absent  on any given day and because children are sometimes reshuffled among groups
during  the day. In order to derive a measure of the number of groups from observed group
size,  we would have to divide total enrollment (by age group) by observed group size, and
this  cannot be done for the oldest groups since no rooms were observed for this group.
Instead  we use the direct measure of the number of groups derived from the roster of
rooms.  This is an integer by construction and is available for all three age groups. We
discuss below the sensitivity of the results to the measure of group size.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics  on the room-specific family characteristics
of the enrolled children (M ij ). These were  collected in a survey instrument distributed to
the  parents of children in the observed rooms. Since no Kindergarten-School-age rooms
were  observed, we assign the center averages to those rooms. We use only three of the
many variables available in this survey: family income, marital status, and the percent of
families  in which at least one parent has graduated from college .   Table  2 describes the
center  characteristics included in the analysis (R j ).  These include state dummies, indicators
of for-profit status; whether the center receives public money tied  to meeting higher than
normal  standards (pubregul);
22  whether the center receives more than half its revenue from23 See Blau (1993), Chipty and Witte (1998) Gormley (1991), Hofferth and Chaplin (1998),
Hotz and Kilburn (1998), Howes et al. (1998), and Phillips, Lande, and Goldberg (1990) for analyses
of the impact of regulations. The apparent widespread noncompliance with child care regulations is an
important topic for future research.
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public  grants, public fees and USDA reimbursement (pubsub); whether the center is part
of  a for-profit national chain; whether the center has a religious affiliation; the center’s age,
and the percent of children who are white.
The  variables Z 1-Z 4 are the linear  combinations of zipcode dummies that, along
with  the local unemployment rate, are used as identifying instruments. These are the
regression  coefficients on zipcode dummies in models of the log fee, whether the center
offers  extended hours, whether the center offers a bilingual program, and the percent of
staff who are white.
As  noted in section 2, we ignore state regulations on group size, staff-child ratio,
and  staff qualifications. If regulations affected the behavior of centers, then we would
expect  to find many centers with a group size and staff-child ratio at or close to the
regulation.  Table 3 presents a summary of the percent of firms at or near the group size and
staff-child  ratio regulations, and the percent of firms out of compliance with the
regulations. Four different measures of group size  and staff-child ratio for each room are
used:  enrollment, present on the day of the interview, average of the observed values, and
the  “prime time” (11:00 a.m.) observed value. The percentage of firms precisely at the
regulations is 0-26 percent in California, 0-35 percent in Colorado, 0-26 percent in
Connecticut,  and 1-27 percent in North Carolina. The highest percentages are generally for
the  enrollment-based measures and the prime-time measures. Non-compliance is
substantial  in all states except Colorado. This suggests that the regulations are not strictly
enforced.  Firms that voluntarily exceed or comply exactly with regulations are
straightforward  to handle analytically, but it is not clear how to deal with firms that are out
of  compliance. We could assume that group size and staff-child ratio are measured with
error,  but this is implausible given that the data were recorded by trained observers. Hence,
we ignore regulations in the empirical analysis, though we use our estimates to simulate




• We rejected all of the implications of cost minimization, including symmetry of
the input demand functions, adding up restrictions on the cost function and input
demand functions, and the hypothesis  that the parameters of the input demand
functions  are equal to the equivalent cost function parameters. These conclusions
hold regardless of other aspects of the specification.
• We rejected the hypothesis that the parameters of the cost function are the same
for  non-profit and for-profit firms. This was true for every specification we
examined.
• We rejected the hypothesis that the parameters of the cost function are the same
for  the three types of rooms, again regardless of other aspects of the specification.
• We estimated models with up to four points of support in the distribution of
unobserved  center-specific heterogeneity (µ), and found that three points of
supp ort yielded a large improvement in the likelihood compared with two points
(and  two points was a big improvement over one), while four points did not
improve  the likelihood compared to three points. We then estimated
specifications with unobserved room-type-specific heterogeneity ( >)  in addition
to  center-specific heterogeneity. We could not reject the hypothesis that there was
no room-specific heterogeneity.
Rejection  of the implications of cost-minimization means that we cannot interpret
our  cost function parameters in terms of the underlying technology of production of quality.
Nevertheless,  we can derive estimates of the marginal cost of quality from the parameters
of the cost function, and use them to compute the quality supply function. In doing so, we
recognize  that we cannot interpret the resulting supply function as a conventional one that
reflects cost-minimizing behavior.
The  main reason for estimating the input demand functions jointly with the cost
function is to  improve the precision of the cost function estimates by imposing the cross-
equation  restrictions implied by cost-minimization. Having rejected these restrictions, there
is  no reason to estimate the input demand functions since we do not use them in the quality
supply analysis, so we drop them in order to  reduce the number of parameters estimated.19
Even  with this reduction in the number of parameters, there are so many parameters in the
cost  function specification with room-type-specific parameters that we were unable to
achie ve convergence of such a specification allowing for unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore,  we use a specification with parameters that are independent of room-type, but
that are allowed to differ by legal status (for-profit versus non-profit).
B. Cost Function Estimates
Table  4 presents selected cost function parameter estimates, with and without
un observed firm-specific heterogeneity. The parameters shown in Table 4 are those needed
to compute marginal cost; the other cost function  parameters are given in Appendix C. In
the specifications with unobserved heterogeneity the marginal cost of quality is increasing
in Q, but  the coefficient on the quadratic term is small and insignificantly different from
zero  in the for-profit estimates. Among for-profits the marginal cost of quality is higher in
Colorado  and North Carolina than in California (the omitted category) and Connecticut.
This  suggests one reason why quality is lower on average in Colorado and North Carolina:
quality  costs more to produce in those states. The marginal cost of quality is higher in for-
profit  firms that serve a higher proportion of white children and is lower in firms that are
part of a national chain. The latter result  could indicate that there are economies of scale
in some aspects of quality production. The marginal cost of quality is higher in for-profit
firms  that are older, serve higher-income families, and families in which the parents are not
married. Marginal cost is significantly higher in infant-toddler and preschool  rooms than
in  kindergarten-school age rooms (the omitted category). Allowing for unobserved
heterogeneity made a big difference in some of the parameter  estimates.
In  non-profit firms, the marginal cost of quality is higher in church-sponsored
centers  and is lower in centers that meet higher standards (pubregul). Marginal cost is
higher  for non-profits that serve college-educated families, low-income families, and
unmarried parents.
Some  of the implications of these estimates are shown in Table 5, which presents
marginal  cost and the elasticity of cost with respect to quality, overall and by state,
evaluated  at each firm’s observed level of quality, integrated over the estimated
heterogeneity  distribution, and averaged over firms. On average, marginal cost is positive
and  significantly different from zero in for-profit firms, but is negative in non-profits.  The24 The different specifications included using observed group size instead of enrolled group
size, classifying teachers by training instead of education, adding more interactions among the
arguments of the cost function, and using a different number of points of support in the heterogeneity
distribution. We tested the overidentifying restrictions by re-estimating the model including the
identifying instruments (Z’s) in the cost function. The hypothesis that the Z’s could be excluded from the
cost function was not rejected for for-profits but was rejected for non-profits at the five percent level.
However, simulations that were based on the specification that included the Z’s in the cost function were
very similar to those reported below. Omitting the Z’s from the auxiliary equations was strongly rejected
in both cases.
20
average  elasticity of cost with respect to quality is .40 for for-profits, and -.26 for non-
profits.  The former figure is identical to Mocan’s (1997) estimate using the same data,
combining for-profits and non-profits. Figure  1 illustrates how marginal cost varies with
the  level of quality, based on simulations that set each firm’s quality to the same level,
holding  everything else fixed, with the results averaged across firms. Marginal cost is
positive for Q $3  for for-profits, and rises with the level of quality at a decreasing rate.
Marginal cost is positive for Q $5 for non-profits, and rises with the level of quality.
We estimated many other specifications of the cost function in order to determine
whether  the results are sensitive to the specification. In every specification, the marginal
cost  of quality was either negative or close to zero on average for non-profits. In most
specifications,  the marginal cost of quality was positive on average in for-profit centers.
This  important feature of the cost function thus does not appear to be sensitive to the
specification.
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C. Price Function Estimates
Linear regression estimates of the slope coefficients from the price function with
zipcode  fixed effects are presented in Table 6. The hypothesis that the slope coefficients
are  the same across states is rejected. The results indicate that Connecticut is the only state
in  which the market rewards higher-quality care with a significantly higher price, with an
elasticity  of .26. The price-quality elasticity in the other states is .02-.16. Fees are
significan tly higher for infants and toddlers in Colorado and Connecticut, but not in
California  and North Carolina.  Table 5 shows the average level of marginal revenue
evaluated at the observed level of quality in each center. Marginal revenue is positive but
insi gnificantly different from zero in all states and for both types of firms. Figure 1 shows
how  marginal revenue varies with quality. Marginal revenue declines with quality, but
remains positive at all levels of quality (this is an implication of the functional form of the25 As noted above, the quality measure we use is an average of the scores on the 32
individual ECERS items and 28 ITERS items. We reestimated the price equation including the
individual item scores, and found that we could not reject combining the items into a single average
score for any state. This test could only be done for preschool rooms because of insufficient observations
for infant-toddler rooms, and did not include the zipcode fixed effects. There was no obvious pattern
across states in which specific items were associated with price.
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price equation  together with a positive coefficient on  lnQ in the price function). Marginal
cost  and marginal revenue intersect at a low level of quality for for-profits, suggesting that
profit-maximization  will be consistent with the data for for-profits, since their observed
level  of quality is on average low. Marginal cost and marginal revenue intersect at a higher
level  of quality for non-profits, although the large standard errors on both MC and MR for
non-profits  suggest that the 95 percent confidence intervals would include many points of
intersection.
Interpreting  these functions as market price-quality loci, they are a function of
both  preferences and technology and therefore do not directly reveal information about
either.  They are nevertheless quite suggestive. If the marginal cost of producing quality was
zero  or negative, this could explain why the market price-quality elasticity is so low in
three  of the four states in our sample. This hypothesis is consistent with the results in Table
6  for non-profits, but not for-profits, particularly in Colorado and Connecticut, where MC
is  significantly different from zero. An alternative explanation is that parents are unwilling
to  pay more for higher-quality child care, at least when quality is measured by the
developmental  appropriateness of the care. We cannot test this conjecture, so it must be
regarded as provisional. It is however consistent with the findings of Blau and Hagy (1998),
who  report that the income elasticity of demand for quality-related attributes of child care
such as group size, staff-child ratio, and trained providers, is small.
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D. Objective Function Estimates
Table  7 presents estimates of the relative weight on quality in the objective
function of firms, along with  related parameter estimates. The relative weight on quality
( ")  is estimated to be nonzero when it is unconstrained, but the hypothesis that  "=0  is not
rejected  for non-profits. The hypothesis is rejected at the five percent significance level for
for-profits,  but not at the one percent level. An explicit test of the hypothesis of profit-
maximization  rejects it for non-profits. The point estimate of the upper bound on profit for26 An alternative hypothesis that we examined for the objective function of non-profits is
quality-maximization subject to the minimum-profit constraint. We attempted to impose and estimate
this specification, but the likelihood function became unbounded: the estimated standard deviation of the
lower bound on profit approached zero (as did the mean of the lower bound). This suggests that the data
could be consistent with quality-maximization subject to a breakeven constraint for the non-profits.
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non-profits  is around $500 per week, and 15 percent of the non-profit firms in the sample
are  estimated to be constrained by the upper bound. Twenty six percent of the non-profits
are  estimated to be constrained by the lower bound on profit.
26  It is surprising that for-profit
firms  appear to place more weight on quality than non-profits. Figure 1 showed that on
average  MC=MR at Q=3.2 for for-profits, but Table 2 gives the observed average level of
quality  in the for-profit sample as 3.9. The estimates account for this discrepancy by placing
weight  on quality in the for-profit objective function. MC=MR at Q=5.2 for non-profits and
average  observed quality for non-profits is 4.3, so additional weight on quality is not
need ed in the non-profit objective function. The standard errors reported in Table 7 are not
adjusted for the fact that the MC and MR functions used in the estimation are based on
estimated  parameters, so hypothesis tests based on the estimates in Table 7 are suspect. We
are  not confident that these are reliable estimates of the objective functions, so the
simulations  reported below that are based on these estimates were recomputed under
alternative  assumptions about the objective function parameters. The simulation results
were not sensitive to alternative assumptions, except in one case noted below.
E. The Supply of Quality
Since price is  determined by the firm’s choice of quality, we cannot compute a
conventional  supply function. Instead, we simulate supply behavior by varying the intercept
of  the supply function ( 2),  and solving for each firm’s profit-maximizing choice of quality
for  alternative values of  2.  We then average over firms (as well as integrating over the
estimated  heterogeneity distribution). This can be thought of as measuring how a firm
would  respond to an exogenous change in the intercept of the price-quality relationship in
its market. It can also be thought of as the effect of an unconditional (on quality) subsidy
per  hour of care provided. To provide a price metric that is understandable and can be used
to  compute a supply elasticity, the value of  2 underlying each point in the simulation is27 As noted above, we assume that the quantity of services (K and H) and characteristics of
the families served (M) are determined by consumers in response to the price and quality offered by the
firm.  However, we do not allow K,  H, and M to respond to changes in  2 in the simulations. We
estimated regression models to explain how K, H, and M respond to price and quality, and found little
evidence of any response. We are not confident that these models are well-identified in any case. The
simulations should be interpreted with this point in mind.
28 The lack of monotonicity is due to the form of the price function. An increase in the
intercept of the log price function ( 2) raises the intercept of the MR function and steepens its slope. For a
fixed MC function these have offsetting effects on the profit-maximizing level of quality, and there is no
obvious reason why one effect would always dominate the other. We experimented with other forms for
the price function, but the double log form always fit much better than other forms.
29 We computed simulations for the non-profits under the assumption of quality-
maximization subject to a breakeven constraint (a lower bound on profit of zero). This yielded an
implausible quality supply elasticity of -.45 with respect to price.
23
converted  to a value of P evaluated at a fixed level of quality (the sample mean).
27  The
simulations  were computed under the assumption that the relative weight on quality ( ")  is
zero, using estimates from columns 2 and 4 of Table 7.
The  simulated quality supply function is shown in the upper panel of Table 8 by
state  and overall, separately for for-profits and non-profits. Quality supply is not monotonic
with respect to the intercept of the price function, and is quite inelastic on average.
28  The
largest  elasticity is .18 for for-profits in Connecticut, and the average price elasticity of
supply  is .04-.05. This suggests that across-the-board price subsidies have little impact on
quality  supply. Examples of across-the board subsidies are the Child Care Tax Credit and
vouchers  that can be used to reimburse expenses for any paid care arrangement. These are
across-the-board in the sense that they are not tied to the quality of the child care
arrangement. This makes them relatively easy to administer, but the results reported here
imply that such subsidies will elicit modest increases in quality at best. It is possible to
examine the impact of subsidies that are tied to the firm’s level of quality,  by simulating
the  effect of altering the slope of the price-quality function, for example. However, a
subsidy of this sort is  impractical because government agencies cannot readily observe a
firm’s level of quality.
29
A wage subsidy might be an alternative to a price subsidy as a means to increase
the supply of quality. The middle panel of Table 8 shows the simulated impact on quality
of  setting wages for the four types of teachers at alternative levels, holding other things
constant.  The results are again rather discouraging. Higher wages are associated with a30 We also simulated changes in the wage rates of each teacher type holding the wages of the
other types fixed. The results were similar to those shown in the table but generally smaller in
magnitude.
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higher  level of quality supplied by for-profits in each state. A subsidy that  reduces the
effective  wage rate to firms would therefore cause a reduction in the level of quality
supplied.  Higher wages are associated with a higher level of quality supplied by non-profits
on  average as well, with smaller elasticities.
30   In principle, higher wages should raise MC
and  reduce the profit-maximizing level of quality. However, the estimated cost function
fails to satisfy the  properties associated with cost-minimization, so there is no guarantee
that  higher wages will increase marginal cost in practice. There are many interactions
between  wages and other variables in the cost function, so it is difficult to determine the
exact source of the positive association between wages and quality. 
An alternative to subsidies that could be considered as a policy to raise quality
is  to enforce and tighten state regulations. The lower panel of Table 8 presents simulation
results  for alternative group size regulations. The first line of the lower panel shows the
average  profit-maximizing level of quality based on the assumption under which the model
was  estimated, that regulations are not binding or enforced (the note to Table 3 lists the
regulations).  The second line shows the simulated impact of perfect enforcement of existing
regulations  in each state. This causes virtually no change in quality, which is not surprising
in  view of the fact that the majority of firms are already in compliance with the regulations,
and the marginal cost of quality  is hardly affected by group size (see Table 4). The third
line  shows the impact of setting the regulations in each state equal to Connecticut’s
regulations, which are the most stringent of the four states, and enforcing them perfectly.
This  also has little impact on quality. The last two rows show the effects of tightening the
group  size regulations by two children per group, using the uniform application of
Connecticut’s  regulations (row 3) as a starting point. The effects are again negligible.
Simulations based on some of the other specifications we estimated sometimes showed
larger  effects of regulations in particular states, but the effects were always small when
averaged across states.25
6. Conclusions
One of the goals of federal and many state child care policies is  to improve the
quality  of child care. This paper analyzes the behavior of suppliers of child care and reports
results  that are not encouraging from a policy perspective. Policies that would be relatively
straightforward  to implement, such as across-the-board price and wage subsidies and more
stringent  group size regulations, would have negligible impacts on the average level of
child  care quality according to the results presented here. Such policies are straightforward
because  they do not impose heavy information requirements for implementation and
enforcement.  Alternative policies that might be more successful would have to be targeted
at  centers that are willing to maintain a given level of quality or achieve a specified amount
of quality improvement, but measuring quality is costly for government monitoring
agencies.  More easily observed indicators such as group size, staff-child ratio, and the level
of  staff training are unlikely to be good proxies for the measures of quality that actually
matter for child development (Blau, 1997, 1999, in press).
We regard these conclusions as provisional. This is the first paper to analyze the
quality  supply behavior of day care centers, and it is important to determine how robust the
results  are. It is somewhat disconcerting that our cost function estimates are inconsistent
with  the implications of cost-minimization. It is not without precedent in the cost function
literature (for example, see  Berndt and Christensen, 1974; Borjas, 1986; and Nadiri and
Rosen,  1973, among others). Given this finding, it is perhaps not surprising that the
“technology” of quality production appears  to differ by the legal status of the firms. This
could  be another indication that the cost functions we have estimated do not conform to the
predictions of economic theory. It is hard to imagine why the technology would differ by
legal status if all relevant variables  are well-measured. The cost function results for non-
profits seem especially suspect given the large range of  quality over which marginal cost
is estimated to be negative, but this finding was quite consistent across the many
specifications we estimated.
Our  findings on the revenue side are somewhat easier to rationalize and are
consistent with results from other studies: on  average, parents appear unwilling to spend
significantly  more on child care in order to obtain higher quality care. It is not obvious why
parents  behave this way, but one can speculate that many parents do not know how to26
distinguish  low-quality from high-quality care, or are unaware of the benefits to children
of  high-quality care. Alternatively, parents may have the goal of making their children
hap py, which could require substituting expenditures on current child-related consumption
for  “investment” in high-quality child care. The most plausible explanation may be that
parents define child care quality differently than psychologists.
If  child care quality is well-measured by the construct we use here, and if child
care  quality as so measured has beneficial effects on child development, then current child
care  policy is most likely ineffective at providing incentives to improve the quality of care
provided.  An alternative policy would be to treat child care the way K-12 education is
currently  treated by providing free or low cost care of reasonably high quality to all children
at  public expense. This is in fact what most Western European countries already do to a
greater or lesser extent. This is a radical idea in the U.S. context, and we do not suggest
it  here in order to advocate it, but rather to spur discussion. Whether the public sector
would be capable of providing high quality child care on a large scale is an open question.
Based  on our results, it is hard to imagine other policies that would significantly raise the
quality of care in the U.S.Table 1: Room-Level Descriptive Statistics
Infant-ToddlerPreschool Kind.-School
Use any teaching staff with
   Educ<12 .19 .14 .13
   Educ=12 .88 .75 .60
   Educ=13-15 .76 .80 .75
   Educ=16+ .64 .76 .69
Staff Hours per week per room
(if >0)
   Educ<12 13.6 (10.5) 10.3 (10.2) 10.7 (7.4)
   Educ=12 46.1 (28.6) 29.7 (24.2) 24.4 (20.5)
   Educ=13-15 35.7 (24.4) 31.0 (24.5) 29.5 (22.8)
   Educ=16+ 27.8 (23.9) 33.7 (31.7) 39.5 (31.2)
Staff Cost Share (if >0)
   Educ<12 .018 (.021) .016 (.018) .018 (.019)
   Educ=12 .071 (.060) .053 (.053) .040 (.040)
   Educ=13-15 .054 (.047) .063 (.071) .047 (.042)
   Educ=16+ .053 (.054) .089 (.115) .079 (.071)
No. of children enrolled (if >0) 22.4 (14.5) 41.8 (32.7) 26.9 (20.5)
Hours per day per FT child 8.8 (1.0) 8.7 (1.1) 4.9 (1.6)
Number of groups 2.3 (1.2) 2.8 (1.9) 1.6 (0.8)
Enrolled Group Size 9.9 (3.7) 15.8 (7.8) 17.0 (9.2)
Observed group Size 8.1 (3.2) 15.1 (6.1)
Quality 3.4 (1.0) 4.3 (1.0)
Family Characteristics
   Annual Income ($000) 54.6 (19.4) 53.3 (26.8)
   Married .77 (.26) .68 (.28)
   At least one parent att. college .49 (.30) .42 (.29)
No. of centers with any rooms 226 363 210
Number of rooms observed 155 474
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics on Center-Level Variables
All For-profit Non-profit
Total Weekly Cost 5,533 (3765)5672 (3530) 5394 (3991)
Total Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment 69.8 (47.6) 78.1 (52.6) 61.5 (40.5)
Average Weekly Cost per FTE Child  88.7 (40.8) 82.9 (38.1) 94.5 (42.6)
Average Center Quality 4.1 (0.8) 3.9 (1.0) 4.3 (0.9)
     California 4.4 (0.9) 4.3 (0.8) 4.6 (0.9)
     Colorado 4.2 (0.9) 4.0 (0.8) 4.3 (0.9)
     Connecticut 4.3 (1.0) 4.3 (1.0) 4.3 (1.0)
     North Carolina 3.6 (1.0) 3.0 (0.8) 4.1 (0.9)
Total Cost/Quality 1384 (904) 1488 (982) 1281 (916)
Average Cost per Child/Quality 22.1 (10.3) 21.6 (8.8) 22.6 (11.6)
Average Teaching Staff Compensation/hour
   Educ<12 7.39 (3.13) 6.86 (2.01) 7.91 (3.71)
   Educ=12 7.94 (3.65) 7.30 (2.37) 8.58 (4.37)
   Educ=13-15 8.88 (4.53) 8.19 (3.64) 9.57 (4.83)
   Educ=16+ 10.81 (5.79)9.46 (4.46) 12.16 (6.38)
For-profit .50 (.50) 1.00 (0) 0 (0)
Percent of Children White 67 (32) 75 (24) 59 (34)
Meets higher standards (pubregul) .07 (.25) 0 .14 (.34)
>50% of revenue from subsidies (pubsub) .12 (.32) .04 (.19) .19 (.40)
Church-sponsored .19 (.40) 0 .39 (.49)
National Chain .13 (.33) .25 (.44) 0
Center Age (years) 13.3 (12.3) 10.6 (8.3) 16.1 (14.6)
Local Unemployment rate, 1992 7.0 (2.1) 6.7 (1.8) 7.3 (2.3)
Zip code dummies from:
   Z 1: log fee equation .18 (.28) .20 (.24) .15 (.31)
   Z 2: part-day extended care equation .05 (.41) .14 (.41) -.04 (.40)
   Z 3: bilingual program equation -.12 (.28) -.13 (.26) -.11 (.29)
   Z 4: percent of white staff equation .05 (.32) .10 (.31) .00 (.32)
Average Hourly Fee 2.06 (.84) 2.16 (.73) 1.97 (.94)
Number of Centers 370 185 185Table 3: Compliance with Regulations


























Enrolled IT 10 (19) 33 (27) 35 (53) 9 (3) 26 (47) 21 (19) 27 (42) 25 (14)
Enrolled PS 4 (14) 42 (36) 6 (11) 10 (9) 11 (24) 4 (4)
Today IT 5 (13) 19 (13) 14 (36) 1 (1) 13 (35) 14 (13) 18 (42) 14 (9)
Today PS 3 (8) 33 (30) 3 (8) 7 (6) 5 (16) 2 (2)
Average IT 0 (4) 4 (4) 6 (23) 3 (3) 12 (25) 30 (25) 13 (34) 8 (7)
Average PS 7 (16) 43 (42) 0 (5) 6 (6) 4 (16) 6 (4)
Prime IT 0 (0) 4 (4) 0 (10) 6 (3) 20 (42) 20 (18) 16 (41) 5 (3)
Prime PS 4 (14) 13 (9) 2 (7) 6 (4) 5 (14) 5 (4)
Staff-Child Ratio (SCR)
Enrolled IT 14 (23) 38 (31) 16 (21) 4 (3) 15 (17) 5 (4) 23 (25) 30 (30)
Enrolled PS 11 (12) 7 (7) 16 (19) 4 (4) 6 (7) 4 (3) 19 (22) 0 (0)
Today IT 5 (12) 26 (21) 8 (12) 0 (0) 7 (9) 3 (2) 19 (22) 22 (21)
Today PS 5 (6) 3 (2) 13 (16) 1 (0) 5 (7) 2 (1) 14 (19) 0 (0)
Average IT 4 (13) 17 (13) 0 (10) 6 (3) 5 (10) 17 (15) 6 (12) 24 (23)
Average PS 1 (2) 7 (6) 1 (6) 5 (4) 0 (2) 4 (3) 1 (8) 1 (0)
Prime IT 26 (35) 13 (9) 20 (36) 11 (8) 17 (37) 10 (7) 27 (38) 31 (27)
Prime PS 5 (7) 7 (5) 13 (27) 6 (3) 4 (6) 8 (7) 12 (26) 5 (5)
Notes:  “Enrolled” uses the room roster, “Today” uses the room roster counting only children present on the day of the
interview,  “Average” is the average of the five observed values during the morning observation period, and “Prime” is the
observed value at 11:00 a.m. IT = Infant-toddler rooms, PS = Preschool rooms. The first figure in each cell is the percent
of  firms exactly at the regulation (first column for each state), or out of compliance with the regulation (second column for
each state). The second figure  (in parentheses) is the percent of firms at or just above or just below the regulation (first
column)  or out of compliance (second column), where firms just above (just below for staff-child ratio) are treated as being
in  compliance. “Just above (below)” means the next value in the frequency distribution. In states with multiple regulations
(which vary by age within IT and PS), compliance means being at any of the regulations, and out-of-compliance means
being above (below, for SCR) all of the regulations. The regulations are:
CA: IT GS: 12  PS GS: 15  IT SCR: 1/4 PS SCR:1/12
CO: IT GS: 10, 14 PS GS: none IT SCR: 1/5, 1/7 PS SCR:1/8, 1/10, 1/12
CT: IT GS: 8 PS GS: 20   IT SCR: 1/4      PS SCR: 1/10      
NC: IT GS: 10, 12 PS GS: 10,15,20 IT SCR: 1/5, 1/6 PS SCR:1/10,1/15,1/20
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Table 4: Selected Cost Function Parameter Estimates
For-profit Non-profit
No heterogeneity Heterogeneity No
Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity
LnQ -1.17 (.89)  -2.61 (.66)** -1.91 (2.08) -2.13 (1.20)*
(LnQ)
2 -.30 (.28) .08 (.21) -.10 (.32) .99 (.28)**
LnQ*lnG .21 (.26) -01 (.19) .35 (.34) .23 (.27)
LnQ*lnK -.28 (.22) -.02 (.15) -.03 (.38) -.09 (.28)
LnQ*CO .48 (.34) .61 (.23)** .60 (.34)* .04 (.28)  
LnQ*CT .18 (.29) .09 (.19) .21 (.35) .06 (.27)
LnQ*NC .23 (.38) .81 (.25)** .45 (.35) -.06 (.27)
LnQ*White 1.22 (.33)** .81 (.22)** .52 (.40) .15 (.29)
LnQ*Pubsub .77 (.35)** .10 (.25) .59 (.31)* .29 (.28)
LnQ*Chain -.44 (.21)** -.42 (.15)**
LnQ*Years in
operation
.47 (1.15) 1.43 (.75)*.06 (.76) -.005(.55)
LnQ*Church .39 (.26) .67 (.20)**
LnQ*Pubregul -.10 (.40) -.74 (.31)**
LnQ*Parents
College
.80 (.34)** -.35 (.24) 1.38 (.57)** 2.01 (.44)**
LnQ*Parent
Income
.51 (.63) 2.47 (.43)** .28 (1.03) -2.45 (.86)**
LnQ*Parents
Married
-.60 (.43) -1.75 (.35)** -1.59 (.63)** -1.04 (.52)**
LnQ*IT room .25 (.50) 2.32 (.38)** .63 (1.52) -1.43 (.83)
LnQ*PS room .63 (.55) 1.77 (.40)** 1.38 (1.61)-.36 (.81)
Ln L -684.2 -517.0 -847.3 -655.4
No. of
parameters
234 244 244 254
Notes: See Appendix Table C-1 for the other parameter estimates from the models with heterogeneity. * and ** indicate
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent and five percent levels, respectively.31
Table 5
Estimates of Marginal Cost, Marginal Revenue, and Elasticity of Cost with Respect to Quality
For-profit Non-profit
All
Marginal Cost 482 (112) -715 (175)    
Marginal Revenue 327 (241) 286 (196)
Elasticity of Cost wrt Quality  .40 (.06) -.26 (.11)
California
Marginal Cost 359 (282) -737 (297)
Marginal Revenue 244 (739) 129 (496)
Elasticity of Cost wrt Quality  .33 (.14) -.30(.20)
Colorado
Marginal Cost 485 (179) -438 (304)
Marginal Revenue 400 (486) 414 (499)
Elasticity of Cost wrt Quality  .40 (.12) -.11 (.19)
Connecticut          
Marginal Cost 715 (135) -1159 (306)
Marginal Revenue 452 (306) 470 (308)
Elasticity of Cost wrt Quality  .58 (.10) -.29 (.15)
North Carolina
Marginal Cost 394 (231) –568 (212)
Marginal Revenue 224 (220) 151 (148)
Elasticity of Cost wrt Quality  .31 (.10) -.35 (.15)
Notes:  Standard errors (in parentheses) are derived by taking 1,000 random draws from the joint distribution
of  all the parameters, computing the variable of interest (e.g. average marginal cost), and using the standard
deviation of the resulting distribution.32
Table 6










California .02 (.22).26 (.20).38 71 99
Colorado .16 (.19).49 (.13)** .15 56 100
Connecticut .26 (.13)* .40 (.13)** .34 54 99
North
Carolina
.10 (.11).16 (.15).06 45 98
All .19 (.08)** .40 (.08)** .60 226 396
Notes:  Each model included zipcode dummies in addition to the variables shown in the table. Test-statistic
for the hypothesis that the slope coefficients are the same in each  state is 3.84~ F(6, 159). The hypothesis
is rejected at the 1 percent level of significance.33
Table 7
































































Percent of Firms at
the upper bound
15.6 15.3 13.9
Percent of firms at
the lower bound
26.0 26.4 0
Ln Likelihood -294.8 -297.2 -376.7 –376.2 –391.0
Note: Profit-maximization for non-profits implies both  "=0 and that the lower bound on profit is irrelevant.34
Table 8: Simulated Supply of Quality
For-profit Non-profit
Price All CA CO CT NC All CA CO CT NC
1.00 4.36 5.31 3.94 4.16 4.00 5.28 5.07 5.53 5.52 5.13
1.13 4.35 5.19 4.01 4.15 4.03 5.29 5.08 5.44 5.63 5.07
1.28 4.38 5.20 3.96 4.30 4.05 5.30 4.96 5.45 5.77 5.08
1.45 4.29 5.08 3.92 4.02 4.09 5.36 5.10 5.39 5.90 5.12
1.63 4.30 4.97 3.89 4.17 4.13 5.38 5.15 5.41 5.84 5.16
1.85 4.32 4.85 4.01 4.34 4.06 5.36 5.08 5.46 5.73 5.21
2.09 4.41 4.87 4.14 4.54 4.11 5.43 5.09 5.55 5.82 5.31
2.36 4.48 4.88 4.17 4.74 4.16 5.53 5.16 5.75 5.89 5.35
2.66 4.52 4.77 4.34 4.92 4.10 5.58 5.22 5.72 6.01 5.41
3.01 4.58 4.67 4.54 5.10 4.05 5.61 5.26 5.73 6.05 5.45
Elas. .04 -.11 .13 .18 .01 .05 .03 .03 .10 .06
Wage Simulations
11 4.49 5.59 3.95 3.77 4.56 4.87 4.83 5.09 4.64 4.90
13 4.38 5.10 4.10 4.24 4.04 4.59 4.26 5.04 4.61 4.48
15 4.73 5.03 4.66 5.37 3.90 4.52 4.26 5.29 4.34 4.19
17 5.03 5.21 5.05 5.96 3.97 4.49 4.13 5.59 4.20 4.01
19 5.30 5.43 5.32 6.30 4.23 4.56 4.03 5.80 4.43 3.98
21 5.33 5.48 5.49 6.51 3.93 4.64 4.04 5.96 4.51 4.04
23 5.44 5.48 5.60 6.66 4.11 4.65 4.01 6.05 4.52 4.04
25 5.54 5.60 5.71 6.72 4.25 4.68 4.10 6.06 4.54 4.02
27 5.64 5.70 5.81 6.77 4.37 4.80 4.18 6.43 4.50 4.06
29 5.72 5.79 5.89 6.80 4.47 4.91 4.37 6.60 4.53 4.13
Elas. .25 .09 .38 .50 .06 .06 -.02 .29 -.002 -.10
Regulations     
1 4.58 4.67 4.54 5.10 4.05 4.18 3.91 5.12 4.20 3.50
2 4.58 4.67 4.55 5.10 4.05 4.15 3.88 5.11 4.13 3.51
3 4.58 4.67 4.55 5.10 4.05 4.13 3.93 5.03 4.06 3.50
4 4.59 4.68 4.56 5.10 4.05 4.14 3.93 5.01 4.22 3.42
5 4.60 4.68 4.57 5.11 4.06 4.11 3.86 4.99 4.28 3.33
Notes to Table 7: The ECERS/ITERS quality scale has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum of 7. These bounds were imposed when
solving for the optimal level of quality. The wage simulations vary the wages of all four teacher types jointly. The wage rates shown in the
table  are for college graduates. The wages of college attendees in the simulations are $2 less than for college graduates, and so forth for the
other groups. The elasticities are the average arc elasticities from one simulated value to the next, averaged over the simulations. See  the
text for interpretation of the regulation simulations.Figure 1A: Estimated Average Marginal 

























Figure 1B: Estimated Average Marginal 
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If a given center does not have rooms of a particular type, then we leave out the
terms  for that room type from the likelihood function. We observe C j ,  (but not C ij )  D ijk ,  Q ij ,
(i=1,2 only; we  assume Q 3j  = average observed center quality), S ijk ,  g ij ,  G ij ,  H ij ,  R j , M ij , K ij ,
and  W jk .  The log likelihood function for a sample of J centers is (conditioning on R and M
is implicit)
            J
lnL  =   3lnL j .
            j=1
        A    
L j  =  3JhL j (µ h).
        h=1 
L j (µ h) = Pr(C j , D ijk , Q ij , S ijk , H ij , G ij , W jk , K ij   ￿ i, k  * µ h)
      B    B        B
=   3     3      3<1n1 <2n2 <3n3 Pr(C j ,  D ijk ,  Q ij ,  S ijk ,  H ij , G ij ,  W jk   ￿ i, k  * µ h,   >1n1 ,   >2n2 ,   >3n3 ).
   n1=1 n2=1 n3=1
Pr(C j , D ijk , Q ij , S ijk , K ij , H ij , G ij , W jk   ￿ i, k  * µ h,  >1n1 ,  >2n2 ,  >3n3 )
= Pr(C j   * G ij , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk   ￿ i, k; µ h,  >1n1 ,  >2n2 ,  >3n3 )
*Pr(S ijk , D ijk   ￿ i, k * G ij  , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk   ￿ i, k; µ h,  >1n1 ,  >2n2 ,  >3n3 )
*Pr(G ij , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk     ￿ i, k * µ h,  >1n1 ,  >2n2 ,  >3n3 )
S ijk  and D ijk  are jointly determined if the tobit assumption holds; otherwise they are
conditionally independent. G ij  and C j  are conditionally independent in the case of a non-
structural ordered model  for G ij ,  which is the approach we adopt here. The first line after
the equality can be written
Pr(C j   * G ij , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk   ￿ i, k; µ h,  >1n1 ,  >2n2 ,  >3n3 )
= Pr([ 3
3
i=1 exp{lnC ij }] + ,cj   *Gij , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk   ￿ i, k; µ h,  >1n1 , >2n2 , >3n3 )])
=  N( ,Cj / FC)/ FC.
If  we do not make the tobit assumption then we let the parameters determining D ijk  be
different than those of the S ijk  demand equation. This yields for the second line above
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Pr(S ijk , D ijk   ￿ i, k * G ij  , Q ij , K ij , H ij , W jk   ￿ i, k; µ h,  >n1 ,  >n2 ,  >n3 ,  Jm)
     3    T








    i=1 k=1
where  D
*
ijk  =  $Dik  +  3m(Dikm lnW ijm  +  (DGik lnGij  +  (DRik Rj  +  (DMik Mij  +  (DKik lnKjj  +
(DHik lnHjj  +  DµDik µ j  +   D>Dik >ij
is our parameterization of equation (6). Finally,
Pr(Q ij , G ij , K ij , H ij , W jk     ￿ i, k * µ h,  >n1 ,  >n2 ,  >n3 )
      3   T         
=  J  J([ N( ,Wjk / FW)/ FW]
Dijk )(Pr(G ij ))
I(Gij>0) ( M(I Gij )
I(Gij>0) (1- M(I Gij ))
1-I(Gij>0) )  
    i=1 k=1
  2
*[ N( ,Kij / FK)/ FK][ N( ,Hij / FH)/ FH][ JN( ,Qij / FQ)/ FQ]
i=1
where
Gij  = n  iff   6n  $ G
i (W j1 ,...,  W jT , H ij ,  Q ij ,  R j ,  M ij ,  G ij ,  K ij ,  µ j ,   >ij ,   ,Gij )  >  6n-1 ,
n=1,...,G
max
I(G ij >0) = 1 if G ij >0 and I(G ij >0) = 0 if G ij =0; and
Pr(G ij ) = 1/(1 + exp{G
i }) if G ij  = 1
Pr(G ij )  = [exp{G
i  +  6n-1 }/(1  + exp{G
i  +  6n-1 })]  - [exp{G
i  +  6n}/(1 + exp{G
i  +  6n})]
if G ij  = n, n=2,...,G
max  - 1
Pr(G ij ) = [exp{G
i  +  6Gmax-1 }/(1 + exp{G
i  +  6Gmax-1 })] if G ij  = G
max
where G
i  is the function defined in equation (12) in the text.43
Appendix B
The ECERS items are listed below.  The ECERS items that are also part of the ITERS
scale are indicated with an (i). Additional ITERS items are listed below the ECERS
items.
1. Greeting/departing (i) 17. Gross motor space
2. Meals/snacks (i) 18. Gross motor equipment
3. Nap/rest (i) 19. Gross motor time
4. Diapering/toileting (i) 20. Supervision (gross motor)
5. Personal grooming (i) 21. Art (i)
6. Furnishings (routine) (i) 22. Music/Movement (i)
7. Furnishings (learning) (i) 23. Blocks (i)
8. Furnishings (relaxation) (i) 24. Sand/water (i)
9. Room arrangement(i) 25. Dramatic play (i)
10. Child related display (i) 26. Schedule (creative)
11. Understanding language 27. Supervision (creative)
12.Using language 28. Space to be Alone
13. Reasoning 29. Free play
14. Informal language (i) 30. Group time
15. Fine motor 31. Cultural Awareness (i)
16. Supervision (fine motor) 32. Tone
Additional ITERS items:
Health practice Active physical play
Health policy Peer interaction
Safety practice Adult-child interaction
Safety policy Discipline
Books and pictures Schedule of daily activities
Eye-hand coordination44
Appendix B (concluded)
Examples of instructions to raters include the following.
Item Inadequate    Minimal                 Good                 Excellent
    1                 2            3                4       5         6               7
Under-  Few materials   Some materials   Many materials Everything in 5 plus
standing present and   present, but not   available for teacher provides good
Language little use of    regularly avail-   free choice and language model
materials to    able or used for   supervised use. throughout the day 
help children   language devel-   At least one (e.g. gives clear
understand    opment.   planned act- directions, uses
language (e.g.     ivity daily.  words exactly 
no daily story    scheduled   descriptions).
time).  
Art Few art materials Some materials Individual Variety of materials
Activities available; regi- available for expression        available for free
mented use of free choice but and free choice choice. Attempt to
materials (e.g. major emphasis encouraged with relate art activities to
mostly teacher- on projects that art materials. other experiences.






Interactions between teacher wages and other variables
For-Profit Firms Non-Profit Firms
Variables Ln(W(1)) Ln(W(2)) Ln(W(3)) Ln(W(4)) Ln(W(1)) Ln(W(2)) Ln(W(3)) Ln(W(4))
Intercept 3.3043 1.1851 -5.5618 2.2211 -0.3456 6.0598 1.6667 -4.0556
(1.4450) (2.4377) ( 2.3393) (1.3324) (2.5967) (2.2141) (2.6970) (1.7153)
Ln(K) -1.4012 0.3892 0.1171 0.3833 -0.7512 1.8285 -0.2638 -.0921
(0.3086) (0.3180) ( 0.2651) (0.1830) (.4883) (.4299) (.4764) (.3878)
Ln(H) 0.2611 5.8218 -0.8923 -2.6697 2.4391 -3.4146 -2.3426 2.3228
(1.3016) (1.1852) ( 1.0408) (0.7242) (1.4199) (1.4833) (0.9598) (1.0051)
Ln(G) 0.9915 -0.5133 1.5237 -1.3357 -0.8325 -1.2718 0.5081 0.6901
(0.4187) (0.4015) ( 0.3522) (0.2840) (.4980) (.4256) (.4827) (.3582)
Ln(W(1)) 4.0192 2.9880 -4.7239 -2.52215 -5.6793 1.2930 0.6802 3.4357
(1.2056) (1.1936) ( 0.9045) (0.7146) (2.6634) (1.6917) (1.3178) (0.9204)
Ln(W(2)) 2.9880 -5.6761 1.2764 1.5184 1.2930 -0.0365 -1.0983 -1.1620
(1.1936) (1.0772) ( 0.5780) (0.5536) (1.6917) (1.3430) (1.0396) (.7579)
Ln(W(3)) -4.7239 1.2764 4.2462 0.5940 0.6802 -1.0983 -0.6267 -0.2221
(0.9045) (0.5780) ( 0.5037) (0.5329) (1.3178) (1.0396) (1.1930) (.7655)
Ln(W(4)) -2.5221 1.5184 0.5940 -0.5709 3.4357 -1.1620 -0.2221 -0.3484
(0.7146) (0.5536) ( 0.5329) (0.3568) (0.9204) (.7579) (.7655) (.6115)
CO -1.8355 1.5107 0.3456 0.1166 -1.9433 -0.2904 -1.0635 1.9491
(0.5620) (0.5238) ( 0.4596) (0.2779) (0.6792) (0.5489) (0.4674) (0.3761)
CT -2.4124 0.5151 0.4339 0.3289 -2.3878 1.1307 0.5188 0.6259
(0.3589) (0.3619) ( 0.2943) (0.2572) (0.6087) (0.4635) (0.5180) (0.3484)
NC -2.1078 0.5325 1.2393 -0.0629 0.7593 -0.4177 -2.1374 2.0684
(0.6337) (0.5042) ( 0.5001) (0.2908) (0.6565) (0.4794) (0.5302) (0.3354)
White 2.3741 -0.2901 -0.0066 -1.3343 -0.1095 1.3783 -0.1221 -0.9890
(0.6474) (0.4942) ( 0.4007) (0.3301) (0.6024) (0.5336) (0.5402) (0.3701)
Pubregul 0.9411 -1.0028 -0.4068 0.4393
(0.6196) (0.6934) (0.6830) (0.3002)
Church -1.7814 1.6348 0.4179 -0.4435
(0.4535) (0.4206) (0.3776) (0.2207)
Pubsub -11.9036 9.1607 -5.5882 0.4102 -0.9120 1.3816 0.6671 -0.9099
(2.7794) (1.5384) ( 0.7249) (0.4938) (0.7074) (0.5522) (0.6919) (0.2705)
Chain 1.3437 -0.3326 -0.7571 -0.1554
(0.3896) (0.3224) ( 0.2751) (0.1999)
Center -6.0668 0.4116 2.9703 -0.0073 -3.8212 0.1161 1.6094 0.5576
(1.9643) (1.1982) ( 1.1832) (1.0282) (1.8471) (1.4853) (1.1161) (0.9003)
College 1.5390 -0.1992 -0.2407 -0.3844 -4.0661 2.4685 0.6608 0.1409
(0.6468) (0.6968) ( 0.5267) (0.3378) (0.9311) (0.9127) (0.8102) (0.5948)
Income -2.6797 5.4196 -3.5086 0.0548 6.5616 -6.2565 -1.4031 2.6675
(0.8818) (0.9174) ( 0.7269) (0.2872) (1.5706) (1.3314) (0.9576) (0.7484)
Married 3.5343 -6.6373 1.2001 1.8173 -0.7657 -0.2379 0.7794 -0.4372
(0.8926) (0.8709) ( 0.6646) (0.4045) (0.8212) (0.7830) (0.8156) (0.6846)
IT Room -6.9978 1.5143 2.6167 -0.4514 -0.3550 -0.1500 1.3035 -0.8817
(1.2092) (1.0407) ( 0.9563) (0.6317) (1.2290) (1.5166) (1.2411) (0.7186)
PS Room -7.0458 2.2472 0.9609 0.3511 2.2995 -1.0222 -0.8822 -0.9642
(1.1632) (0.8975) ( 0.8357) (0.5348) (1.3468) (1.5980) (1.1817) (0.7524)46
Appendix C (continued)
 Table A (concluded)
Main Effects
Variables For-Profit Firms Non-Profit Firms
CO -1.7287 (0.9147) 1.9494 (.7125)
CT 1.8635 (0.6681) 0.1333 (.7330)
NC -1.0425 (1.0228) -1.0000 (.7467)
White -2.1335 (0.5319) -0.4487 (.5560)
Pubregul 1.2403 (.6232)
Pubsub 13.4503 (3.9899) -0.6783 (.4847)
Church -1.1590 (.4001)
Chain 0.6842 (0.2974)
Center age 3.2913 (1.5286) 3.2705 (1.2418)
College -0.5382 (0.6332) -1.9669 (.8120)
Income -1.7714 (0.8628) 1.0180 (1.6181)
Married 2.3072 (0.7084) 2.9005 (.9779)
IT Room 4.0143 (1.3469) 2.7913 (1.4121)
PS Room 4.6830 (1.4421) 2.8375 (1.4093)
Intercept 8.9351 (2.8584) 3.6432 (2.4660)
Ln(K) 1.7636 (0.3751) -0.7550 (.4721)
(Ln(K))^2 0.1016 (0.0354) 0.0851 (.0477)
Ln(H) -5.4465 (1.1846) 0.7926 (1.1885)
(Ln(H))^2 -0.8516 (0.2206) -1.7066 (.5641)
Ln(K)*Ln(H) -0.7067 (0.2053)
Ln(K)*Ln(G) -0.0518 (0.0544) 1.3111 (.5278)
Ln(H)*Ln(G) -0.2279 (0.3055) 0.1415 (.0584)
Ln(G) -1.1018 (0.4696) 0.9356 (.5674)
(Ln(G))^2 1.0953 (.0681)
sc 0.0802 (0.0630) .1262 (.0595)47
Appendix C (continued)
Table B
Ordered Logit   Coefficients
Variables For-Profit Firms Non-Profit Firms
INTERCEPT 9.7530 (2.3076) 2.1338 (2.1587)
Ln(K) 3.8492 (0.2626) 5.3935 (.3858)
Ln(H) -0.7106 (0.6652) 2.3824 (.8155)
Ln(W(1)) -0.0571 (0.9972) -.6518 (.9279)
Ln(W(2)) -1.6576 (0.8961) 1.1902 (0.9352)
Ln(W(3)) -0.5025 (0.7910) 0.6725 (.8774)
Ln(W(4)) 0.0801 (0.5103) 1.4139 (.7448)
CO -1.6898 (0.6723) .1354 (.4706)
CT -0.1507 (0.4632) -.1243 (.5519)
NC -1.2400 (0.6385) -.0303 (.4821)
White 0.5876 (0.6753) 1.2051 (.5917)
Pubregul 0.3695 (.4950)
Pubsub 0.0171 (0.7915) -.4155 (.4787)
Church 1.9889 (.3693)
Chain -0.2941 (0.2707)
Center age 0.3403 (1.0236) -1.8044 (.9407)
College 0.2721 (0.4604) 1.1430 (.6629)
Income -1.2632 (0.8305) -1.1681 (.8600)
Married 0.8542 (0.6009) -.4893 (.7206)
IT Room 3.5399 (0.5620) 1.8477 (.6078)
PS Room 2.0618 (0.5233) -.0579 (.5531)
RHO 1.3278 (0.4394) -2.9155 (.6336)
CUTOFFS ( k's)
1 6.6254 (  0.0741) -1.0903 (.0766)
2 4.4141 (  0.1017) -3.2731 (.1206)
3 3.0989 (  0.1845) -4.9025 (.1887)
4 2.0839 (  0.2661) -5.6358 (.3774)
5 0.8008 (  0.3947) -6.0882 (.7708)
6 -0.3444 (  0.8724) -6.8697 (.4676)
7 -0.3444 (  1.0315) -8.0514 (.4898)
8 -0.3444 (  1.0315) -8.8413 (.9611)
9 -1.1159 (  0.9958) -9.3772 (.9921)




For-Profit Firms Non-Profit Firms
Variable Ln(W) G>0 Ln(Q) Ln(K) Ln(H) Ln(W) G>0 Ln(Q) Ln(K) Ln(H)
Intercept 2.461 -1.867 1.302 -0.963 -0.733 2.189 -1.553 1.559 -1.837 -.826
(0.053) (0.940) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000) (.063) (.860) (.097) (.000) (.000)
College 0.037 0.056 0.159 0.144 0.022 -.131 .716 .062 -.301 .013
(0.024) (0.801) (0.052) (0.140) (0.034) (.047) (.645) (.060) (.172) (.046)
Income 0.078 -0.281 -0.010 -0.144 0.018 .265 -.800 .258 .509 -.038
(0.035) (0.805) (0.070) (0.203) (0.051) (.074) (.829) (.081) (.262) (.073)
Married -0.113 0.064 0.058 -0.052 0.031 .091 .360 -.029 .257 .074
(0.030) (0.858) (0.061) (0.167) (0.040) (.047) (.718) (.062) (.188) (.049)
IT -0.019 0.286 -0.193 -0.110 0.651 -.043 .159 -.191 -.015 .593
(0.013) (0.313) (0.029) (0.087) (0.022) (.024) (.247) (.037) (.097) (.027)
PS -0.013 3.582 0.408 0.651 -.008 4.500 .510 .583
(0.012) (0.583) (0.080) (0.020) (.020) (.422) (.083) (.023)
CO -0.445 2.044 -0.102 -0.386 0.039 -.213 .645 -.051 .152 .087
(0.031) (0.571) (0.057) (0.161) (0.040) (.036) (.498) (.054) (.136) (.038)
CT -0.154 1.593 -0.064 -0.878 -0.019 .240 .754 -.078 -.182 .025
(0.028) (0.533) (0.053) (0.151) (0.038) (.041) (.558) (.056) (.145) (.041)
NC -0.408 2.382 -0.316 -0.212 -0.053 -.176 .855 -.054 .261 -.046
(0.030) (0.639) (0.053) (0.149) (0.036) (.035) (.449) (.047) (.126) (.035)
White -0.006 0.923 0.049 -0.151 -0.034 -.139 .799 -.153 -.226 .019
(0.035) (0.821) (0.065) (0.184) (0.046) (.040) (.573) (.055) (.158) (.041)
Pubregul -.007 -.194 .085 .263 .001
(.032) (.433) (.046) (.118) (.032)
Pubsub -0.392 0.994 -0.222 -0.554 -0.048 .002 .292 -.084 -.265 -.013
(0.037) (0.984) (0.083) (0.202) (0.046) (.028) (.382) (.044) (.109) (.030)
Church -.247 .114 -.162 -.153 .036
(.022) (.284) (.033) (.078) (.022)
Chain 0.037 2.355 0.120 0.181 0.048
(0.015) (0.679) (0.032) (0.080) (0.020)
Cen. age 0.138 -0.950 -0.282 -0.539 -0.112 .338 .880 .150 1.110 .064
(0.090) (1.005) (0.167) (0.479) (0.116) (.058) (.933) (.090) (.257) (.066)
Z(1) 0.085 -1.682 0.076 0.412 -0.114 .195 -1.074 .024 -.390 -.156
(0.038) (0.894) (0.004) (0.212) (0.052) (.043) (.667) (.065) (.170) (.045)
Z(2) -0.011 0.069 0.005 -0.014 -0.001 .007 .020 -.007 -.007 .001
( 0.004) (0.095) (0.009) (0.025) (0.006) (.005) (.072) (.008) (.020) (.005)
Z(3) 0.015 1.023 0.046 0.028 0.014 .023 .280 -.006 .165 -.017
(0.023) (0.498) (0.040) (0.116) (0.028) (.026) (.342) (.038) (.096) (.025)
Z(4) 0.000 -0.494 -0.070 0.081 -0.034 .079 .298 -.010 -.078 -.022
(0.029) (0.737) (0.056) (0.151) (0.036) (.038) (.467) (.054) (.150) (.037)
Z(5) 0.061 -0.130 0.120 0.114 -0.057 -.034 -.374 .131 .174 .022
(0.031) (0.789) (0.060) (0.168) (0.041) (.038) (.540) (.055) (.144) (.040)
RHO 0.488 -0.555 0.162 0.068 0.037 .579 -.700 .192 .336 -.032
(0.034) (0.355) (0.043) (0.114) (0.031) (0.054) (0.349) (.040) (.102) (.031)
SIGMA 0.172 0.212 0.653 0.180 .211 .200 .571 .167
(0.022) (0.043) (0.033) (0.033) (.024) (.044) (.036) (.036)Appendix C (concluded)
Table C (concluded)
Heterogeneity Coefficients: For-Profit Firms
Ah Ph Bh µh
MASS POINT  1 1.1820 0.4504 0.0000 -0.4934
(0.2827)
MASS POINT  2 1.3304 0.4703 -0.3746 -0.0500
(0.2831) (0.0805)
MASS POINT  3 0.0000 0.1243 1.0000 0.4934
Scale 0.987 (.067)
Heterogeneity Coefficients: Non-Profit Firms
Ah Ph Bh µh
MASS POINT  1 -0.0875 .2378 .0000 -.5806
(.2415)
MASS POINT  2 .06607 .5026 -.0368 -.0107
(.2104) (.0754)
MASS POINT  3 .0000 .2596 1.0000 .5806
Scale 1.161 (0.099)
Note:        Ph = exp{A h} /  3i  exp{A i }.        mi  = Scale * (exp{B h} / (1 + exp {B i }) – 0.5)
49